Turkijos pozicija NATO yra sudėtingesnė nei bet kada
Ankara draudžia rizikas — o aljansas netenka kantrybės.
Turkijos strateginė pozicija NATO visada buvo nepatogi. Ji kontroliuoja Bosforą ir Dardanelus, turi antrą pagal dydį aljanso kariuomenę ir yra svarbios infrastruktūros Indžirlike šeimininkė. Ji taip pat nupirko Rusijos oro gynybos sistemas ir palaikė prekybą su Maskva per visą karą Ukrainoje.
S-400 klausimas
Turkijos S-400 Rusijos oro gynybos sistemos pirkimas 2019 m. lieka labiausiai ardančiu sprendimu aljanso naujausios istorijos. JAV pašalino Turkiją iš F-35 programos. S-400 guli sandėliuose, niekada nenaudotos operaciškai — brangus pirkinys, kurio Turkija nei naudojo, nei atsisakė.
Turkija žaidžia žaidimą, kurio kitos NATO narės negali sau leisti — naudodama savo nepakeičiamumą nuolaidoms gauti, tuo pat metu drausdama visas baigtis.
— Sinan Ülgen, EDAM Stambulas
Bosforo svertas
Turkijos Montrė konvencijos taikymas uždaryti Bosforą karo laivams po 2022 m. vasario buvo vienas svarbiausių karinių ankstyvojo karo sprendimų. Tai sutrukdė Rusijai sustiprinti Juodosios jūros laivyną.
Turkey's presidential and parliamentary elections are due in 2028. Opposition parties have signalled a more Western-oriented foreign policy, though they are cautious about appearing too deferential to NATO partners on sovereignty questions.
What the alliance can do
NATO's leverage over Turkey is more limited than it might appear. Expulsion is legally impossible — the Washington Treaty has no exit mechanism. Sanctions would damage alliance cohesion more than Turkish behaviour. The practical toolkit: sustained diplomatic pressure, economic incentives tied to F-35 restoration, and patience for domestic political change that might produce a more predictably Western-oriented government.
NATO įtaka Turkijai ribotesnė nei atrodo. Pašalinimas teisiškai neįmanomas. Sankcijos pakenktų aljanso vienybei labiau nei Turkijos elgesiui. Praktinis įrankių rinkinys: nuolatinis diplomatinis spaudimas, ekonominės paskatos susietos su F-35 atkūrimu ir kantrybė vidaus politiniams pokyčiams.
The S-400 problem that didn't go away
Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system in 2019 remains the most concrete manifestation of the alliance's dysfunction. The United States expelled Turkey from the F-35 programme, imposed CAATSA sanctions, and demanded the S-400 be deactivated or transferred. Turkey has done none of these things. The systems sit in storage, technically inactive, but available. The question of what happens when a NATO ally possesses a Russian air defence system that could potentially be used to track allied aircraft has never been answered.
Ukraine and the Bosphorus
Turkey's management of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles under the Montreux Convention has been one of the most consequential decisions of the Ukraine war. By invoking Montreux to close the straits to warships of belligerent states after February 2022, Turkey prevented Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet while also preventing Western naval vessels from entering. This decision was consistent with Turkey's self-defined role as a neutral facilitator — and it infuriated both sides.
The Montreux Convention (1936) gives Turkey the right to regulate passage through the Turkish Straits. In wartime, Turkey may close the straits to warships of belligerent states. This right, exercised in 2022, has both constrained Russian naval operations and limited NATO's ability to project power into the Black Sea.
Erdoğan's strategic logic
The key to understanding Turkish policy is recognising that Erdoğan does not see NATO membership and Russian engagement as contradictory. He sees them as complementary levers. Being in NATO gives Turkey protection and access to Western technology and markets. Engaging Russia gives Turkey energy security, grain deals, and a role as indispensable mediator that it could not claim as a purely Western-aligned state.
What the alliance is running out of
NATO has historically managed Turkey through a combination of deference, side payments, and avoidance of direct confrontation. The logic was that Turkey's strategic value — controlling the Straits, hosting Incirlik, running the second-largest army — outweighed the costs of its behaviour. That calculation is becoming harder to sustain as the behaviour escalates and the cost of tolerance rises.