Why Europe Cannot Ignore the South China Sea

In September 2025, the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle conducted a freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea, the third such European mission in two years. Germany deployed the frigate Baden-Württemberg to the Taiwan Strait. The UK's HMS Queen Elizabeth carrier group made a scheduled transit through contested waters near the Spratly Islands.

These deployments represent a fundamental shift in European strategic thinking. A decade ago, most EU member states considered the Indo-Pacific a remote theatre, relevant mainly for trade. Today, a growing consensus holds that European security cannot be separated from the balance of power in Asia.

The strategic logic for European engagement in the Indo-Pacific is clear. Over €3.4 trillion in annual EU trade passes through the South China Sea. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan would devastate European semiconductor supplies. And allowing Beijing to unilaterally redraw maritime boundaries would set a precedent that would embolden revisionist powers everywhere, including in Europe's own backyard.

But critics argue that European deployments are more symbolic than substantial. France can sustain one carrier group in the region for a few months. Germany's navy has fewer than 15 combat-ready surface vessels. And the UK, post-Brexit, is struggling to maintain its own carrier strike capability.