Why the Ceasefire Framework Is Built on Sand

The Istanbul II process has been hailed in some European capitals as a breakthrough — a framework that both Kyiv and Moscow have at least nominally engaged with. The celebration is premature. A close reading of the draft framework reveals that the core disagreements have not been resolved; they have been deferred.

Any ceasefire must address the question of which territory each side controls at the moment of signing. The current Russian position — that the February 2022 line of control should be the basis for negotiations — is incompatible with Ukraine's constitutional position, which does not permit the alienation of sovereign territory. There is no formula that satisfies both constraints simultaneously.

Ukraine's core demand is a credible security guarantee that prevents a repeat of February 2022. NATO membership remains the only guarantee that Kyiv regards as credible. The alliance is not willing to offer that. Everything else is a substitution that Ukraine can refuse.