Europos energetikos žiema: ar žemynas pasiruošęs?

Three winters after the Russian gas cut-off, European energy infrastructure looks dramatically different. LNG terminals that did not exist in 2021 now account for 40% of European gas imports. Renewable capacity has expanded faster than any decade since the 1970s energy crisis. Industrial demand has structurally declined — partly through efficiency, partly through deindustrialisation.

Gas storage across the EU stood at 58% at the start of March 2026 — well below the five-year seasonal average of 71% at this point in the year. A cold spring could draw down reserves faster than summer injection can replenish them. The risk is not a crisis on the scale of 2022; it is a winter of high prices and constrained industrial supply.

The distributional politics of the energy transition remain unresolved. Industrial electricity prices in Germany are running at three times the pre-crisis level. Energy-intensive manufacturers continue to relocate production outside the EU. The constituencies that bear the costs of the transition — industrial workers, rural households, energy-intensive regions — are increasingly expressing that discontent through the ballot box.